What Changed After The Treaty Of Versailles

Opening article of the reparations section of the Treaty of Versailles

Article 231, often known as the War Guilt Clause, was the opening article of the reparations department of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended the First World War betwixt the High german Empire and the Allied and Associated Powers. The article did not use the word "guilt" but it served as a legal basis to compel Germany to pay reparations for the war.

Article 231 was i of the most controversial points of the treaty. It specified:

"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and impairment to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a outcome of the war imposed upon them past the assailment of Germany and her allies."

Germans viewed this clause as a national humiliation, forcing Federal republic of germany to have full responsibility for causing the state of war. German politicians were vocal in their opposition to the article in an endeavor to generate international sympathy, while German language historians worked to undermine the article with the objective of subverting the entire treaty. The Allied leaders were surprised at the German reaction; they saw the article just equally a necessary legal basis to extract bounty from Germany. The article, with the signatory's name changed, was likewise included in the treaties signed by Deutschland'south allies who did not view the clause with the same disdain as the Germans did. American diplomat John Foster Dulles—one of the two authors of the article—after regretted the wording used, believing it further aggravated the German people.

The historical consensus is that responsibility or guilt for the war was not attached to the article. Rather, the clause was a prerequisite to let a legal basis to exist laid out for the reparation payments that were to exist made. Historians have as well highlighted the unintended damage created past the clause, which caused anger and resentment amongst the High german population.

Background [edit]

Avocourt, 1918, one of the many destroyed French villages, candidates for reconstruction funded past reparations

On 28 June 1914 the Bosnian-Serb Gavrilo Princip assassinated the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in the name of Serbian nationalism.^[1] This caused a diplomatic crunch, resulting in Republic of austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia and sparking the First World State of war.^[two] Due to a diverseness of reasons, within weeks the major powers of Europe—divided into two alliances known every bit the Key Powers and the Triple Entente—went to war. As the conflict progressed, additional countries from around the earth became drawn into the conflict on both sides.^[3]

Fighting would rage across Europe, the Eye Eastward, Africa and Asia for the next 4 years.^[four] On 8 January 1918, United States President Woodrow Wilson issued a argument that became known every bit the Fourteen Points. In office, this spoken communication called for the Central Powers to withdraw from the territories they had occupied, for the creation of a Smoothen country, the redrawing of Europe's borders along indigenous ("national") lines, and the formation of a League of Nations.^{[5] [half dozen]} During the northern-hemisphere autumn of 1918, the Central Powers began to collapse.^[7] The German armed forces suffered a decisive defeat on the Western Front, while on the Home Front end the Imperial German language Navy mutinied, prompting uprisings in Germany which became known as the High german Revolution.^{[eight] [ix] [10]} The German regime attempted to obtain a peace settlement based on the Fourteen Points, and maintained information technology was on this footing that Germany surrendered. Following negotiations, the Allied Powers and Frg signed an armistice, which came into effect on 11 November while German forces were still positioned in France and Belgium.^{[xi] [12] [13]}

On xviii January 1919 the Paris Peace Conference began. The conference aimed to constitute peace betwixt the war's belligerents and to plant the mail-war world. The Treaty of Versailles resulting from the conference dealt solely with Germany.^{[14] [15]} This treaty, forth with the others that were signed during the conference, each took their name from the suburb of Paris where the signings took place.^[xvi] While 70 delegates from 26 nations participated in the Paris negotiations, representatives from Deutschland were barred from attention, nominally over fears that a German delegation would attempt to play one country off against the other and unfairly influence the proceedings.^{[16] [17]}

Writing of the article [edit]

The Americans, British and French all differed on the issue of reparations settlement. The Western Front end had been fought in France, and that countryside had been heavily scarred in the fighting. France'southward nearly industrialized region in the north-east had been laid to waste product during the German retreat. Hundreds of mines and factories were destroyed along with railroads, bridges and villages. Georges Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of France, thought it appropriate that any just peace required Germany to pay reparations for the damage they had caused. He also saw reparations as a means to ensure that Frg could non again threaten France and as well to weaken the German ability to compete with France's industrialization.^[18] Reparations would too go towards the reconstruction costs in other countries, such every bit Belgium, also directly affected by the war.^[19] British Prime Minister David Lloyd George opposed harsh reparations in favour of a less crippling reparations settlement then that the German economic system could remain a viable economical power and British trading partner. He furthermore argued that reparations should include state of war pensions for disabled veterans and allowances to be paid to war widows, which would reserve a larger share of the reparations for the British Empire.^{[20] [21] [22]} Wilson opposed these positions, and was adamant that there exist no indemnity imposed upon Germany.^[23]

During the peace briefing the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties^[a] was established to examine the background of the war. The Commission reasoned that the "war was premeditated past the Key Powers ... and was the event of acts deliberately committed [past them] to brand information technology unavoidable", concluding that Frg and Austria-Hungary had "deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made past the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war." This decision was duly incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles,^[31] led by Clemenceau and Lloyd George who were both insistent on the inclusion of an unequivocal statement of Germany's total liability.^[32] This left Wilson at odds with the other leaders of the conference. Instead, he proposed a repetition of a note sent by United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing to the German Government on 5 Nov 1918, stating that the "Allied Governments ... sympathise that bounty volition be made by Deutschland for all damage washed to the noncombatant population of the Allies and their belongings past the aggression of Germany ..."^{[23] [32]}

"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Federal republic of germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Centrolineal and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected equally a upshot of the state of war imposed upon them by the aggression of Deutschland and her allies."

– Article 231^[33]

The actual wording of the article was chosen by American diplomats Norman Davis and John Foster Dulles.^[34] Davis and Dulles produced a compromise between the Anglo-French and American positions, wording Commodity 231 and 232 to reverberate that Germany "should, morally, pay for all war costs, but, considering information technology could not possibly afford this, would exist asked simply to pay for civilian damages."^[23] Article 231, in which Germany accustomed the responsibility of Frg and its allies for the damages resulting from the Starting time World State of war, therefore served as a legal footing for the articles following it within the reparations chapter, obliging Germany to pay compensation express to civilian damages.^[35] Similar clauses, with slight modification in wording, were nowadays in the peace treaties signed by the other members of the Cardinal Powers.^[b]

Reaction [edit]

German language interpretation [edit]

Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau

Foreign Government minister Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau headed the 180-strong German language peace delegation. They departed Berlin on 18 April 1919, anticipating that the peace talks would before long start and that they and the Allied Powers would negotiate a settlement. Before, in February of that year, Brockdorff-Rantzau had informed the Weimar National Assembly that Federal republic of germany would have to pay reparations for the devastation caused by the state of war, only would not pay for actual war costs.^[40] The German government had also taken the position that information technology would be "inadvisable ... to elevate the question of war guilt".^[41] On 5 May, Brockdorff-Rantzau was informed that there would be no negotiations. One time the German delegation received the conditions of peace they would have fifteen days to reply. Following the drafting of the treaty, on 7 May the German and Allied delegations met and the Treaty of Versailles was handed off to be translated and for a response to exist issued. At this meeting Brockdorff-Rantzau stated that "We know the intensity of the hatred which meets us, and we have heard the victors' passionate demand that every bit the vanquished we shall be made to pay, and every bit the guilty we shall exist punished". However, he proceeded to deny that Germany was solely responsible for the state of war. Post-obit the meeting, the German language delegation retired to translate the eighty,000 give-and-take certificate. Equally soon every bit the delegation realized the terms of peace, they agreed that they could not accept it without revision. They and so proceeded to send their Centrolineal counterparts, message after message attacking each part of the treaty.^[42] On 18 June, having disregarded the repeated explicit decisions of the regime, Brockdorff-Rantzau declared that Article 231 would have Frg have full responsibility for the war by force.^{[41] [43] [44]} Max Weber, an advisor with the German delegation, agreed with Brockdorff-Rantzau, as well challenging the Allies over the issue of war guilt. He preferred to turn down the treaty than submit to what he chosen a "rotten peace".^[45]

On 16 June, the Centrolineal Powers demanded that Germany unconditionally sign the treaty within vii days or face the resumption of hostilities. The German government was divided on whether to sign or turn down the peace treaty. On 19 June, Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann resigned rather than sign the treaty and was followed by Brockdorff-Rantzau and other members of the government, leaving Germany without a cabinet or peace delegation. Afterwards being advised past Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg that Federal republic of germany was in no status to resume the war, President Friedrich Ebert and the new Chancellor, Gustav Bauer, recommended that the Weimar National Assembly ratify the treaty. The Assembly did and so past a big majority, and Clemenceau was informed 19 minutes before the deadline expired. Frg unconditionally signed the peace treaty on 22 June.^{[46] [47]}

Initially, Article 231 was non correctly translated. Rather than stating "... Germany accepts responsibility of Germany and her allies causing all the loss and harm ...", the German language Government's edition read "Germany admits it, that Deutschland and her allies, as authors of the state of war, are responsible for all losses and damages ...".^[48] Germans felt that they the land had signed away her honor, and in that location was a prevailing belief of humiliation as the article was seen, overall, equally an injustice.^{[45] [49]} Historian Wolfgang Mommsen commented that despite the public outrage, German language government officials were enlightened "that Deutschland'due south position on this thing was not nearly and so favorable as the purple government had led the German public to believe during the state of war."^[41]

Allied opinion on commodity [edit]

The Allied delegation initially thought Article 231 to exist a mundane addition to the treaty intended to limit German liability with regard to reparations, and were surprised at the vehemence of the German protests.^[50] Georges Clemenceau rebuffed Brockdorff-Rantzau's allegations, arguing that "the legal interpretation [of the article] was the correct 1" and not a matter of political question.^[43] Lloyd George commented that "the English public, like the French public, thinks the Germans must above all acknowledge their obligation to compensate usa for all the consequences of their aggression. When this is done we come to the question of Frg's capacity to pay; nosotros all remember she will exist unable to pay more than this document requires of her."^[50]

Prior to the American entry into the war, Woodrow Wilson called for a "peace of reconciliation with Germany", what he dubbed a "peace without victory". His wartime speeches, nevertheless, rejected these earlier notions and he took an increasingly argumentative opinion towards Germany.^[51] Post-obit the war, on 4 September 1919, during his public entrada to rally American support for the Treaty of Versailles, Wilson commented that the treaty "seeks to punish 1 of the greatest wrongs always done in history, the wrong which Germany sought to do to the earth and to culture, and in that location ought to exist no weak purpose with regard to the awarding of the penalty. She attempted an intolerable affair, and she must be made to pay for the attempt."^[52] Regardless of the rhetoric, the American position was to create a balanced treaty that would appease anybody. Gordon Auchincloss, secretary to Edward 1000. House (one of Wilson's advisers), sent a copy of the clause to the State Department and stated "you lot will note that the President's principles accept been protected in this clause".^[53]

Historian William Keylor commented that initially both Us diplomats believed that they had "devised a brilliant solution to the reparation dilemma"; appeasing both the British and French, also every bit Allied public opinion irrespective of the fact that Allied leaders were aware of concerns surrounding German willingness to pay reparations and the disappointment that could follow.^[53] Vance C. McCormick (an economical adviser of Wilson) emphasized this point, and stated: "...the preamble is useful. We are adopting an unusual method in not fixing a definite sum. The preamble tends to explicate this, and further, prepares the public mind for thwarting as to what actually tin can be secured."^[54] In 1940, Dulles stated that he was surprised that the article "could plausibly exist, and in fact was, considered to be a historical judgement of war guilt". He farther noted that the "profound significance of this commodity ... came about through accident, rather than design".^[55] Dulles took it personally that the Treaty of Versailles failed in its intentions of creating a lasting peace and believed that the treaty was 1 of the causes of the 2nd World War. By 1954, equally Us Secretarial assistant of Country and in discussion with the Soviet Union in regards to German reunification, he commented that "Efforts to bankrupt and humiliate a nation merely incite a people of vigor and of courage to interruption the bonds imposed upon them. ... Prohibitions thus incite the very acts that are prohibited."^[56]

Touch [edit]

Reparations [edit]

Trains, loaded with mechanism, deliver their cargo as reparation payment in kind.

Compensation demanded from the defeated political party was a common characteristic of peace treaties.^[57] The financial burden of the Treaty of Versailles was labelled "reparations", which distinguished them from castigating settlements normally known as indemnities. The reparations were intended for reconstruction and equally compensation for families who had been bereaved by the war.^[nineteen] Sally Marks wrote that the commodity "was designed to lay a legal basis for reparations" to be paid. Article 231 "established an unlimited theoretical liability" for which Germany would have to pay but the following article "in fact narrowed High german responsibility to civilian damages".^{[35] [c]} When the final reparation figure was established in 1921, information technology was based on an Allied assessment of [the] German capacity to pay, non on the basis of Centrolineal claims.^[35]

The London Schedule of Payments, of 5 May 1921, established the full liability of the combined Primal Powers at 132 billion gold marks. Of this effigy, Germany was only required to pay 50 billion gold marks ($12.5 billion), a smaller amount than they had previously offered for terms of peace.^[59] Reparations were unpopular and strained the German economy only they were payable and from 1919 to 1931, when reparations ended, Deutschland paid fewer than 21 billion gold marks.^[60] The Reparation Commission and the Bank for International Settlements gave a total German payment of twenty.598 billion gold marks, whereas historian Niall Ferguson estimated that Germany paid no more than than 19 billion gilt marks.^{[61] [62]} Ferguson as well wrote that this sum was only 2.4 per cent of German national income between 1919 and 1932, while Stephen Schuker places the effigy at an boilerplate of 2 per cent of national income between 1919 and 1931, in greenbacks and kind, making a full transfer equal to 5.3 per cent of national income for the period.^{[62] [63]} Gerhard Weinberg wrote that reparations were paid, towns were rebuilt, orchards replanted, mines reopened and pensions paid just the burden of repairs was shifted from the High german economy to the damaged economies of the victors.^[64]

Effects on German language political opinion and revisionism [edit]

Domestic German language opposition to Article 231 has been held to take created a psychological and political burden on the post-war Weimar Republic.^{[65] [66]} German politicians seeking international sympathy would utilise the commodity for its propaganda value, convincing many who had not read the treaties that the commodity implied total war guilt.^[35] German revisionist historians who after attempted to ignore the validity of the clause found a ready audience among 'revisionist' writers in France, Britain, and the U.s..^[67] The objective of both the politicians and historians was to evidence that Germany was non solely guilty for causing the state of war; if that guilt could be disproved the legal requirement to pay reparations would disappear.^[68] To that stop, the German regime funded the Centre for the Study of the Causes of the State of war. This subject, the question of Germany's guilt (Kriegsschuldfrage or war guilt question) became a major theme of Adolf Hitler's political career.^[69]

United States Senator Henrik Shipstead argued that the failure to revise the article became a factor in Hitler'south rise to power.,^{[70] [71]} a view held past some historians, such equally Tony Rea and John Wright, who wrote that "the harshness of the War Guilt Clause and the reparations demands made information technology easier for Hitler to gain power in Germany."^[72] Despite these views, the historical consensus is that the commodity and the treaty, did non cause the rise of Nazism just that an unconnected rise in extremism and the Groovy Depression led to the NSDAP gaining greater electoral popularity then beingness maneuvered into function.^{[73] [74]} The Marxist historian Fritz Klein wrote that while at that place was a path from Versailles to Hitler, the former did non make "Hitler's takeover of power inevitable" and that "the Germans had a choice when they decided to take this path. In other words, they did not take to. Hitler's victory was not an unavoidable result of Versailles."^[75]

Historical assessment [edit]

In 1926, Robert C. Binkley and A. C. Mahr of Stanford University, wrote that German accusations of the commodity assigning war guilt were "ill-founded" and "mistaken". The article was more than "an assumption of liability to pay damages than an admission of war guilt" and compared it with "a man who undertakes to pay all the toll of a motor accident than to the plea of guilty entered past an defendant criminal". They wrote that "it is absurd" to charge the reparation articles of the treaty with whatsoever "political meaning" and the legal interpretation "is the but one that can stand". They concluded that German opposition "is based upon a text which has no legal validity whatsoever, and which Deutschland never signed at all."^[76] Sidney Fay was the "almost outspoken and influential critic" of the article. In 1928, he concluded that all of Europe shared the blame for the war and that Germany had no intention of launching a full general European war in 1914.^[77]

In 1937, E. H. Carr commented that "in the passion of the moment" the Centrolineal Powers had "failed to realize that this extorted admission of guilt could prove nothing, and must excite bitter resentment in German minds." He ended "German men of learning set to piece of work to demonstrate the chastity of their country, fondly believing that, if this could be established, the whole textile of the treaty would collapse."^[78] René Albrecht-Carrié wrote in May 1940, that "article 231 gave rising to an unfortunate controversy, unfortunate because it served to raise a false outcome." He wrote that the German language inter-state of war statement "rested on her responsibility for the out-break of the war" and if that guilt could be disproved and then the legal requirement to pay reparations would disappear.^[68]

In 1942, Luigi Albertini published The Origins of the State of war of 1914 and ended that Germany was primarily responsible for the outbreak of the state of war.^{[79] [fourscore]} Albertini's work, rather than spurring on new debate, was the culmination of the first research phase into the war guilt question.^[81] The effect came back betwixt 1959 and 1969, when Fritz Fischer in Germany's Aims in the Commencement World State of war and War of Illusions "destroyed the consensus about shared responsibility for the Starting time World War" and "placed the arraign ... firmly on the shoulders of the Wilhelmine elite." By the 1970s, his work "had emerged as the new orthodoxy on the origins of the First World War".^[82] In the 1980s, James Joll led a new wave of First World State of war enquiry terminal "that the origins of the Offset World War were "circuitous and varied" although "by December 1912" Germany had decided to go to war.^[83]

In 1978, Marks re-examined the reparation clauses of the treaty and wrote that "the much-criticized 'war guilt clause', Commodity 231, which was designed to lay a legal basis for reparations, in fact makes no mention of war guilt" but only specified that Frg was to pay for the damages caused by the state of war they imposed upon the allies and "that Germany committed an act of aggression against Kingdom of belgium is beyond dispute". "Technically, Britain entered" the state of war and French troops entered Belgium "to honor" the "legal obligation" to defend Belgium under the 1839 Treaty of London and that "Germany openly acknowledged her responsibleness in regard to Kingdom of belgium on August 4, 1914, and May seven, 1919." Marks as well wrote that "the same clause, mutatis mutandis" was incorporated "in the treaties with Austria and Hungary, neither of whom interpreted it every bit declaration of war guilt."^[35] Wolfgang Mommsen wrote that "Austria and Hungary, understandably paid no attending to this aspect of the draft treaty".^[41]

In 1986, Marks wrote that the German foreign office, supported by military and civilian notables, "focused on Article 231 ... hoping that, if one could abnegate German responsibility for the war, not only reparations only the entire treaty would collapse".^[84] Manfred Boemeke, Gerald Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser wrote that "businesslike requirements characteristically influenced the shaping of the much misunderstood Article 231. That paragraph reflected the presumed legal necessity to define German language responsibility for the war in social club to specify and limit the Reich'due south obligations".^[85] P.Thousand.H. Bell wrote that despite the article non using the term 'guilt', and while "it may exist that its drafters did not intend to convey a moral sentence of Deutschland", the article has "about universally" became known as the war guilt clause of the treaty.^[67] Margaret MacMillan wrote that the German public's estimation of Article 231 every bit unequivocally ascribing the error for the war to Germany and her allies, "came to be the object of detail loathing in Frg and the cause of uneasy consciences amidst the Allies." The Allies never expected such a hostile reaction, for "no one idea there would be whatsoever difficulty over the clauses themselves."^[l]

Stephen Neff wrote that "the term 'war guilt' is a slightly unfortunate one, since to lawyers, the term 'guilt' primarily connotes criminal liability" while "the responsibility of Germany envisaged in the Versailles Treaty ... was civil in nature, comparable to the indemnity obligation of classical only-war theory."^[31] Louise Slavicek wrote that while "the article was an honest reflection of the treaty-writers' beliefs, including such a clause in the peace settlement was undiplomatic, to say the to the lowest degree."^[86] Diane Kunz wrote that "rather than existence seen every bit an American lawyer's clever attempt to limit actual German fiscal responsibility by ownership off French politicians and their public with the sop of a piece of paper" Commodity 231 "became an hands exploitable open sore".^[87] Ian Kershaw wrote that the "national disgrace" felt over the article and "defeat, revolution, and the establishment of commonwealth", had "fostered a climate in which a counter-revolutionary set of ideas could gain wide currency" and "enhanced the creation of a mood in which" extreme nationalist ideas could gain a wider audience and have concord.^[88]

Elazar Barkan argues that by "forcing an admission of war guilt at Versailles, rather than healing, the victors instigated resentment that contributed to the rise of Fascism."^[89] Norman Davies wrote that the commodity invited Germany "to have sole guilt for the preceding state of war".^[90] Klaus Schwabe wrote that the article'south influence went far beyond the give-and-take of war guilt. By "refusing to admit Germany's 'state of war guilt' the new High german government implicitly exonerated the erstwhile monarchial order" and more than importantly failed "to dissociate itself from the one-time government." In doing so "information technology undermined its claim that post-revolutionary Germany was a historic new democratic beginning deserving credit at the peace conference."^[91]

Notes [edit]

Footnotes

1. ^ The commission was equanimous of sixteen members from ten countries.^[24] All were trained legal professionals.^[25] They were:
   
   • Us: Us Secretarial assistant of State Robert Lansing besides every bit international lawyer, and former solicitor to the United States Department of Country, James Brown Scott.^{[26] [27]}
   • British Empire: Chaser General Gordon Hewart, Solicitor General Ernest Pollock, and Prime Minister of New Zealand William Massey.^[26]
   • French republic: Politician André Tardieu, as well as the Dean of the Paris Police Faculty Ferdinand Larnaude.^{[25] [26] [28]}
   • Italy: Mr. Scialoja and Mr. Raimondo^[26]
   • Japan: Expert in international law Mineichirō Adachi, and diplomat Harukazu Nagaoka.^{[26] [29]}
   • Belgium: International law scholar Edouard Rolin-Jaequemyns^{[26] [25]}
   • Greece: Greek Foreign Minister and scholar of international police Nicolas Politis^{[26] [25]}
   • Poland: Constantin Skirmunt^[26]
   • Romania: Jurist Southward. Rosental^[30]
   • Serbia: Master international law expert to the Serbian peace delegation and Rector of the University of Belgrade Slobodan Jovanović^{[thirty] [27]}
2. ^ Article 117 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye: "... Austria accepts the responsibility of Austria and her Allies for causing the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected every bit a effect of the war imposed upon them by the assailment of Austria-Republic of hungary and her Allies".^[36] Article 161 of the Treaty of Trianon: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Republic of hungary accepts the responsibility of Republic of hungary and her allies for causing the loss and impairment to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them past the assailment of Austro-hungarian empire and her allies."^[37] Article 121 of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine: "Republic of bulgaria recognises that, by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied and Associated Powers, she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds, for which she ought to make complete reparation".^[38] Article 231 of the Treaty of Sevres: "Turkey recognises that by joining in the war of assailment which Germany and Austro-hungarian empire waged against the Allied Powers she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds for which she ought to make complete reparation."^[39]
3. ^ "The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the resources of Germany are non adequate ... to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.
   The Allied and Associated Governments, however, crave, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency ..."^[58]

Citations

1. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, pp. xxv and 9.
2. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, p. 1078.
3. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, pp. 11–13.
4. ^ Simkins, Jukes & Hickey 2003, p. nine.
5. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, p. 429.
6. ^ 14 Points Speech
7. ^ Beller 2007, pp. 182–95.
8. ^ Simkins 2002, p. 71.
9. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, p. 638.
10. ^ Schmitt 1960, p. 101.
11. ^ Schmitt 1960, p. 102.
12. ^ Weinberg 1994, p. 8.
13. ^ Boyer et al. 2009, p. 526.
14. ^ Slavicek 2010, pp. 8 and 37.
15. ^ Osmańczyk 2003, p. 1898.
16. ^ ^{a b} Schmitt 1960, p. 103.
17. ^ Phillips 2007, p. 152.
18. ^ Slavicek 2010, pp. 41–3 and 58.
19. ^ ^{a b} Weinberg 1994, p. 14.
20. ^ Slavicek 2010, p. 44.
21. ^ Brezina 2006, p. 21.
22. ^ Yearwood 2009, p. 127.
23. ^ ^{a b c} Martel 2010, p. 272.
24. ^ United States Department of State 1919, pp. 204–5.
25. ^ ^{a b c d} Lewis 2014, p. 42.
26. ^ ^{a b c d east f g h} United states of america Section of Land 1919, p. 204.
27. ^ ^{a b} Lewis 2014, p. 43.
28. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, p. 1159.
29. ^ Fassbender & Peters 2012, p. 740.
30. ^ ^{a b} U.s. Department of State 1919, p. 205.
31. ^ ^{a b} Neff 2005, p. 289.
32. ^ ^{a b} Steiner 2005, p. 59.
33. ^ Treaty of Versailles, Commodity 231
34. ^ Immerman 1998, pp. viii–10.
35. ^ ^{a b c d e} Marks 1978, pp. 231–232.
36. ^ Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Commodity 177
37. ^ Treaty of Trianon, Article 161
38. ^ Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, Article 121
39. ^ Treaty of Sèvres, Article 231
40. ^ Immature 2006, pp. 133–135.
41. ^ ^{a b c d} Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, pp. 537–538.
42. ^ Young 2006, pp. 135–136.
43. ^ ^{a b} Binkley & Mahr 1926, p. 399.
44. ^ Craig & Gilbert 1994, p. 141.
45. ^ ^{a b} Morrow 2005, p. 290.
46. ^ Shirer 1990, p. 59.
47. ^ Young 2006, pp. 136–137.
48. ^ Binkley & Mahr 1926, pp. 399–400.
49. ^ Binkley & Mahr 1926, p. 400.
50. ^ ^{a b c} MacMillan & Holbrooke 2003, p. 193.
51. ^ Trachtenberg 1982, pp. 490–491.
52. ^ Trachtenberg 1982, p. 491.
53. ^ ^{a b} Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 500.
54. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, pp. 500–501.
55. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 501.
56. ^ Immerman 1998, p. 10.
57. ^ Bell 1986, p. 22.
58. ^ Treaty of Versailles, Commodity 232
59. ^ Marks 1978, p. 237.
60. ^ Bell 1986, p. 38.
61. ^ Marks 1978, pp. 233 and 237.
62. ^ ^{a b} Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 424.
63. ^ Martel 1999, p. 43.
64. ^ Weinberg 1994, p. xvi.
65. ^ Soumerai & Schulz 1998, p. 17.
66. ^ Bendersky 1984, p. 10.
67. ^ ^{a b} Bell 1986, p. 21.
68. ^ ^{a b} Albrecht-Carrié 1940, p. xv.
69. ^ Thomsett 2007, p. xiii.
70. ^ Henig 1995, p. 52.
71. ^ Stuhler 1973, p. 92.
72. ^ Rea & Wright 1997, p. 39.
73. ^ Slavicek 2010, p. 94.
74. ^ Evans 1989, p. 107.
75. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 220.
76. ^ Binkley & Mahr 1926, pp. 398–400.
77. ^ Slavicek 2010, pp. 19–twenty.
78. ^ Welch 1995, p. 271.
79. ^ Lafore 1997, p. 21.
80. ^ Mombauer 2002, pp. 125 and 166.
81. ^ Stevenson 1996, p. 410.
82. ^ Mulligan 2010, pp. 11–12.
83. ^ Mulligan 2010, p. 14.
84. ^ Martel 1999, p. 19.
85. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. xvi.
86. ^ Slavicek 2010, p. 57.
87. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 524.
88. ^ Kershaw 2000, pp. 136–137.
89. ^ Barkan 2000, p. xxiii.
90. ^ Davies 2007, p. 133.
91. ^ Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, p. 48.

References [edit]

Books

• Barkan, Elazar (2000) [1999]. The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices. New York: W. W. Norton. ISBN978-0-393-04886-5.
• Bell, P.M.H. (1986). The Origins of the 2nd World War in Europe (2nd 1997 ed.). London: Pearson. ISBN978-0-582-30470-3.
• Bendersky, Joseph W. (1984). A History of Nazi Federal republic of germany: 1919–1945 (2d 2000 ed.). Chicago: Burnham. ISBN978-0-830-41567-0.
• Beller, Steven (2007). A Concise History of Republic of austria . Cambridge Concise Histories. Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press. ISBN978-0-521-47886-one.
• Boemeke, Manfred F.; Feldman, Gerald D. & Glaser, Elisabeth, eds. (1998). Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years. Publications of the German language Historical Institute. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0-521-62132-8.
• Boyer, Paul Due south.; Clark, Clifford E.; Hawley, Sandra; Kett, Joseph F. & Rieser, Andrew (2009). From 1865. The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People. Vol. two. Boston MA: Cengage Learning. ISBN978-0-547-22278-3.
• Brezina, Corona (2006). The Treaty of Versailles, 1919: A Primary Source Examination of the Treaty That Concluded World War I. Primary Sources of American Treaties. New York: Rosen Key. ISBN978-1-404-20442-iii.
• Craig, Gordon Alexander & Gilbert, Felix, eds. (1994) [1953]. The Diplomats 1919–1939. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN978-0-691-03660-1.
• Davies, Norman (2007). Europe at State of war 1939–1945: No Simple Victory. London: Pan Books. ISBN978-0-330-35212-3.
• Evans, Richard J. (1989). In Hitler's Shadow (1st ed.). New York: Pantheon. ISBN978-067972-348-six.
• Fassbender, Bardo & Peters, Anne, eds. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Police force. Oxford: Oxford University Printing. ISBN978-0-199-59975-2.
• Henig, Ruth (1995) [1984]. Versailles and Later on: 1919–1933. Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-12710-3.
• Immerman, Richard H. (1998). John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Ability in U.S. Foreign Policy. Biographies in American Foreign Policy. Vol. 2. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN978-0-842-02601-vii.
• Kershaw, Ian (2000) [1998]. Hitler: 1889–1936 Hubris. New York: W. W. Norton. ISBN978-0-393-32035-0.
• Lafore, Laurence (1997). The Long Fuse: An Estimation of the Origins of Earth State of war I (2d ed.). Long Grove IL: Waveland Pr Inc. ISBN978-0-88133-954-3.
• Lewis, Marker (2014). The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Offense and Punishment, 1919–1950. Oxford Studies in Modern European History. Oxford: Oxford Academy Press. ISBN978-0-199-66028-5.
• MacMillan, Margaret; Holbrooke, Richard (2003). Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the Earth. New York: Random House. ISBN978-0-375-76052-5.
• Martel, Gordon, ed. (1999). Origins of the Second Globe War Reconsidered (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-16325-5.
• Martel, Gordon, ed. (2010). A Companion to Europe 1900–1945. Hoboken NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN978-i-444-33840-9.
• Mombauer, Annika (2002). The Origins of the First World State of war: Controversies and Consensus. London: Routledge. ISBN978-0-582-41872-ane.
• Morrow, John H. (2005). The Bang-up War: An Regal History. London: Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-20440-8.
• Mulligan, William (2010). Origins of the First Globe War. New Approaches to European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0-521-71394-eight.
• Neff, Stephen C. (2005). War and the Law of Nations: A General History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Printing. ISBN978-0-521-66205-5.
• Phillips, David J. (2007). On This Day. Vol. 1. Bloomington IN: iUniverse. ISBN978-0-595-46288-9.
• Rea, Tony & Wright, John (1997). International Relations 1914–1995. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-199-17167-5.
• Shirer, William (1990). The Rise and Autumn of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon & Schuster; 1st Touchstone editio. ISBN978-0-671-72868-7.
• Simkins, Peter; Jukes, Geoffrey & Hickey, Michael (2003). The First World War: The State of war to End All Wars. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN978-ane-841-76738-3.
• Simkins, Peter (2002). The Western Front 1917–1918. The First World War. Vol. 3. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN978-1-841-76348-iv.
• Slavicek, Louise Chipley (2010). The Treaty of Versailles. Milestones in Modern Earth History. New York: Chelsea House Publications. ISBN978-1-604-13277-ix.
• Soumerai, Eve Nussbaum & Schulz, Carol D. (1998). Daily Life During the Holocaust. Daily Life Through History. Westport, CT: Greenwood Printing. ISBN978-0-313-30202-2.
• Steiner, Zara (2005). The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933. Oxford History of Modernistic Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, Us. ISBN978-0-198-22114-two.
• Stevenson, David (1996). Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–1914. New York: Oxford University Press, USA. ISBN978-0-198-20208-0.
• Stuhler, Barbara (1973). X Men of Minnesota and American Foreign Policy. St Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press. ISBN978-0-873-51080-vi.
• Thomsett, Michael C. (2007). The German Opposition to Hitler: The Resistance, the Underground, and Assassination Plots, 1938–1945. Jefferson NC: McFarland. ISBN978-0-7864-3027-7.
• United States Department of Country (1919). "Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United states of america, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 Volume III". Foreign Relations of the Usa. United states Government Printing Office.
• Weinberg, Gerhard L. (1994). A World at Arms: A Global History of World War 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Printing. ISBN0-521-44317-two.
• Welch, David A. (1995). Justice and the Genesis of War. Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Book 29). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0-521-55868-6.
• Yearwood, Peter J. (2009). Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Policy 1914–1925. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-199-22673-3.
• Young, William (2006). High german Diplomatic Relations 1871–1945: The Wilhelmstrasse and the Formulation of Foreign Policy. Bloomington IN: iUniverse, Inc. ISBN978-0-595-40706-iv.

Encyclopedias

• Osmańczyk, Edmund January (2003). Encyclopedia of the United nations and International Agreements. Vol. 1 (tertiary ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-93921-eight.
• Tucker, Spencer C. & Roberts, Priscilla (2005). The Encyclopedia of World State of war I : A Political, Social, and Armed forces History. Santa Barbara CA: ABC-CLIO. ISBN978-1-85109-420-two.

Journals

• Albrecht-Carrié, René (March 1940). "Versailles Twenty Years After". Political Science Quarterly. New York: The Academy of Political Science. 55 (1): 1–24. doi:10.2307/2143772. ISSN 0032-3195. JSTOR 2143772.
• Binkley, Robert C.; Mahr, Dr. A. C. (June 1926). "A New Estimation of the "Responsibility" Clause in the Versailles Treaty". Electric current History (Periodicals Archive Online ed.). New York: New York Times. 24 (3): 398–400. OCLC 1589080.
• Marks, Sally (September 1978). "The Myths of Reparations". Cardinal European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. xi (three): 231–255. doi:x.1017/s0008938900018707. ISSN 1569-1616. JSTOR 4545835. OCLC 47795498.
• Schmitt, Bernadotte (February 1960). "The Peace Treaties of 1919–1920". Proceedings of the American Philosophical Order. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Guild. 104 (1): 101–110. ISSN 0003-049X. JSTOR 985606.
• Trachtenberg, Marc (July 1982). "Versailles afterwards 60 Years". Periodical of Gimmicky History. One thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publications. 17 (3): 487–506. doi:10.1177/002200948201700305. ISSN 0022-0094. JSTOR 260557. OCLC 1783199. S2CID 154283533.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_231_of_the_Treaty_of_Versailles

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